Business intelligence
Normally describes the result of in-depth analysis of detailed business data. Includes database and application technologies, as well as analysis practices. Sometimes used synonymously with “decision support,” though business intelligence is technically much broader, potentially encompassing knowledge management, enterprise resource planning, and data mining, among other practices. ...
Source: it.csumb.edu/departments/data/glossary.html
Veille économique
Veille qui consiste en la collecte, le traitement et la diffusion de renseignements utiles à l'entreprise en vue de leur exploitation
Source: http://w3.granddictionnaire.com/BTML/FRA/r_Motclef/index1024_1.asp
Competitive intelligence
The process of gathering actionable information on the competitive environment
Source: www.bellomyresearch.com/definitions.htm
Veille à la concurrence
Veille qui consiste en la collecte, le traitement et la diffusion de renseignements relatifs aux concurrents actuels et potentiels de l'entreprise, en vue de leur exploitation.
Source: http://w3.granddictionnaire.com/BTML/FRA/r_Motclef/index1024_1.asp
Economic intelligence
Intelligence regarding foreign economic resources, activities, and policies including the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, labor, finance, taxation, commerce, trade, and other aspects of the international economic system.
Source: www.intelligence.gov/0-glossary.shtml
Intelligence économique
L’intelligence économique consiste en la maîtrise et la protection de l’information stratégique pour tout acteur économique. Elle a pour triple finalité la compétitivité du tissu industriel, la sécurité de l’économie et des entreprises et le renforcement de l’influence de notre pays
Source : http://www.intelligence-economique-lyon.org/
Strategic intelligence
Intelligence that is required for forming policy and military plans at national and international levels
Source: wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn
Renseignement stratégique
Renseignement nécessaire à l'élaboration de la ligne de conduite et des plans militaires à l'échelon national et international
Source : http://w3.granddictionnaire.com/BTML/FRA/r_Motclef/index1024_1.asp
Industrial espionage
Espionage industriel
Action visant à obtenir clandestinement des renseignements confidentiels touchant des procédés de fabrication, des plans de mise en marché ou des projets de développement d'une entreprise rivale.
Source : http://w3.granddictionnaire.com/BTML/FRA/r_Motclef/index1024_1.asp
jeudi 3 mai 2007
vendredi 13 avril 2007
CI, law and ethics: the EEA revisited
HOROWITZ, Richard. CI, law and ethics: the EEA revisited. Competitive Intelligence Magazine, volume 6, number 6, November-December 2003 (accessible at: http://www.scip.org/pdf/Horowitz.pdf ). Consulted the 04-05-07.
Here is just an abstract. You can read the whole article by clicking the link above.
“Law and ethics are important aspects of competitive intelligence (CI), both to the CI practitioner and firm and to the corporate clients who use their services. They are also topics that had been greatly debated in the years following the 1996 passage of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), resulting in short-term concerns for the CI industry but with long-term positive implications. The EEA debate began in February 1997 when SCIP held a two-day symposium in Washington, D.C. analyzing the effect of EEA on CI. The EEA made theft of a trade secret a federal crime for the first time in U.S. history, generating concern and confusion over what was to be considered legal and ethical means of collecting competitive intelligence. Following the passage of the EEA, a spate of articles and presentations warned that this new law would jeopardize the activities of CI professionals and firms. Subsequent situations emerged where corporate clients of CI firms and in-house CI departments were being held back from properly doing their jobs based on these EEA concerns. One of the warnings given at SCIP’s February 1997 symposium: “Your industry is crawling with criminals and you may be one of them. So might your company . . . [the EEA] will surely lead to greater interest
in federal jurisdiction over civil trade secret disputes.”[…]
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: CI, law and ethics: the EEA revisited
DC Creator: HOROWITZ, Richard
DC Subject: competitive intelligence, economic espionage, business intelligence, law
DC Description: “Law and ethics are important aspects of competitive intelligence (CI), both to the CI practitioner and firm and to the corporate clients who use their services. They are also topics that had been greatly debated in the years following the 1996 passage of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), resulting in short-term concerns for the CI industry but with long-term positive implications”
DC Publisher: Competitive Intelligence Magazine
DC Contributor:
DC Date: November-December 2003
DC Type: text
DC Format: PDF
DC Identifier: http://www.scip.org/pdf/Horowitz.pdf
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: international
DC Rights:
Here is just an abstract. You can read the whole article by clicking the link above.
“Law and ethics are important aspects of competitive intelligence (CI), both to the CI practitioner and firm and to the corporate clients who use their services. They are also topics that had been greatly debated in the years following the 1996 passage of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), resulting in short-term concerns for the CI industry but with long-term positive implications. The EEA debate began in February 1997 when SCIP held a two-day symposium in Washington, D.C. analyzing the effect of EEA on CI. The EEA made theft of a trade secret a federal crime for the first time in U.S. history, generating concern and confusion over what was to be considered legal and ethical means of collecting competitive intelligence. Following the passage of the EEA, a spate of articles and presentations warned that this new law would jeopardize the activities of CI professionals and firms. Subsequent situations emerged where corporate clients of CI firms and in-house CI departments were being held back from properly doing their jobs based on these EEA concerns. One of the warnings given at SCIP’s February 1997 symposium: “Your industry is crawling with criminals and you may be one of them. So might your company . . . [the EEA] will surely lead to greater interest
in federal jurisdiction over civil trade secret disputes.”[…]
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: CI, law and ethics: the EEA revisited
DC Creator: HOROWITZ, Richard
DC Subject: competitive intelligence, economic espionage, business intelligence, law
DC Description: “Law and ethics are important aspects of competitive intelligence (CI), both to the CI practitioner and firm and to the corporate clients who use their services. They are also topics that had been greatly debated in the years following the 1996 passage of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), resulting in short-term concerns for the CI industry but with long-term positive implications”
DC Publisher: Competitive Intelligence Magazine
DC Contributor:
DC Date: November-December 2003
DC Type: text
DC Format: PDF
DC Identifier: http://www.scip.org/pdf/Horowitz.pdf
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: international
DC Rights:
jeudi 5 avril 2007
Corporate spying grows
DEARNE, Karen. Corporate spying grows. The Australian, 04/09/02 (accessible at http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail-archive/2002/Apr/0052.html ). Consulted the 03-29-07.
The corporate spy trade is booming. One-quarter of Australia's largest companies admit they are involved in "competitive intelligence gathering", according to a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey.
The information-gathering techniques are almost always legal and carried out by trained professionals - often former government intelligence operatives highly trained in obtaining military and economic secrets.
But the operatives were spying on competing companies rather than foreign governments, and many companies were easy targets, PwC dispute analysis and investigations director Richard Batten said.
"Corporations have people trained to obtain raw data from a wide range of sources and apply traditional intelligence analysis techniques to produce usable information," he said.
"It's worrying to find 62 per cent of companies have no protection in place to stop the loss or theft of intellectual property -- even though 30 per cent admit already experiencing at least one incident."
Competitors were involved in 37 per cent of incidents reported by respondents to PwC's Intellectual Property Loss Survey 2001 -- up 15 per cent from the last survey, in 1998.
Mr Batten said most companies did not properly value their information and intellectual property, and were often unaware that data had been lost.
"If intelligence gathering is being done by a professional, the victim will probably know nothing about it," he said.
"If a customer list is copied and taken out of a company, the original list is still there and they may never know it has been taken."
Forty per cent of incidents were caused by people in a trusted relationship with the company -- employees, consultants and contractors -- up from 12 per cent in 1998.
"These people have internal access and it's easy for them to get information without having to break in or bribe someone," Mr Batten said.
"People get tempted - they may see the value of some information and try to sell it to a competitor."
Theft or loss of laptops was less of a worry than the behaviour of people using them in public places such as airports.
"Businessmen often work on sensitive projects on their laptops while they are in a frequent flyer lounge, on a plane or even in a taxi," he said.
"They don't pay any attention to who's sitting next to them and don't realise how much information can be seen or overheard by others."
Laptops should always be secured by encryption and passwords so data was not readily accessible to anyone who picked up a lost or stolen laptop, he said.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
How to protect IP:
Prepare an inventory that identifies the company's information and intellectual property crown jewels.
Devise a method of valuing these information resources to establish what material is worth protecting.
Undertake a risk management review of the total business operation to discover security deficiencies.
Once the information protection hotspots have been identified, controls can be put in place.
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Corporate spying grows
DC Creator: DEARNE, Karen
DC Subject: business intelligence, corporate spies, competitive intelligence, business spying
DC Description: “The corporate spy trade is booming. One-quarter of Australia's largest companies admit they are involved in "competitive intelligence gathering", according to a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey.
The information-gathering techniques are almost always legal and carried out by trained professionals - often former government intelligence operatives highly trained in obtaining military and economic secrets.” […]
DC Publisher: The Australian
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 04/09/02
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail-archive/2002/Apr/0052.html
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: Australia
DC Rights:
The corporate spy trade is booming. One-quarter of Australia's largest companies admit they are involved in "competitive intelligence gathering", according to a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey.
The information-gathering techniques are almost always legal and carried out by trained professionals - often former government intelligence operatives highly trained in obtaining military and economic secrets.
But the operatives were spying on competing companies rather than foreign governments, and many companies were easy targets, PwC dispute analysis and investigations director Richard Batten said.
"Corporations have people trained to obtain raw data from a wide range of sources and apply traditional intelligence analysis techniques to produce usable information," he said.
"It's worrying to find 62 per cent of companies have no protection in place to stop the loss or theft of intellectual property -- even though 30 per cent admit already experiencing at least one incident."
Competitors were involved in 37 per cent of incidents reported by respondents to PwC's Intellectual Property Loss Survey 2001 -- up 15 per cent from the last survey, in 1998.
Mr Batten said most companies did not properly value their information and intellectual property, and were often unaware that data had been lost.
"If intelligence gathering is being done by a professional, the victim will probably know nothing about it," he said.
"If a customer list is copied and taken out of a company, the original list is still there and they may never know it has been taken."
Forty per cent of incidents were caused by people in a trusted relationship with the company -- employees, consultants and contractors -- up from 12 per cent in 1998.
"These people have internal access and it's easy for them to get information without having to break in or bribe someone," Mr Batten said.
"People get tempted - they may see the value of some information and try to sell it to a competitor."
Theft or loss of laptops was less of a worry than the behaviour of people using them in public places such as airports.
"Businessmen often work on sensitive projects on their laptops while they are in a frequent flyer lounge, on a plane or even in a taxi," he said.
"They don't pay any attention to who's sitting next to them and don't realise how much information can be seen or overheard by others."
Laptops should always be secured by encryption and passwords so data was not readily accessible to anyone who picked up a lost or stolen laptop, he said.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
How to protect IP:
Prepare an inventory that identifies the company's information and intellectual property crown jewels.
Devise a method of valuing these information resources to establish what material is worth protecting.
Undertake a risk management review of the total business operation to discover security deficiencies.
Once the information protection hotspots have been identified, controls can be put in place.
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Corporate spying grows
DC Creator: DEARNE, Karen
DC Subject: business intelligence, corporate spies, competitive intelligence, business spying
DC Description: “The corporate spy trade is booming. One-quarter of Australia's largest companies admit they are involved in "competitive intelligence gathering", according to a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey.
The information-gathering techniques are almost always legal and carried out by trained professionals - often former government intelligence operatives highly trained in obtaining military and economic secrets.” […]
DC Publisher: The Australian
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 04/09/02
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail-archive/2002/Apr/0052.html
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: Australia
DC Rights:
jeudi 29 mars 2007
Competitive Intelligence Programs: An Overview
MALHOTRA, Yogesh. Competitive Intelligence Programs: An Overview. Brint Research Institute (on line), 1996 (accessible at http://www.brint.com/papers/ciover.htm ). Consulted the 03-22-07.
What is a Competitive Intelligence Program?
"A formalized, yet continuously evolving process by which the management team assesses the evolution of its industry and the capabilities and behavior of its current and potential competitors to assist in maintaining or developing a competitive advantage" (Prescott and Gibbons 1993). CIP tries to ensure that the organization has accurate, current information about its competitors and a plan for using that information to its advantage (McGonagle & Vella, 1990).
How is Competitive Intelligence Different Than Business Espionage?
CI uses public sources to find and develop information on competition, competitors, and the market environment (Vella & McGonagle, 1987). Unlike business espionage, which develops information by illegal means like "hacking," CIP uses public information - all information that can be legally and ethically identified and accessed.
How to Determine Competitive Intelligence Information Needs?
Effective implementation of its CIP requires not only information about the competitors, but also information on other environmental trends such as industry trends, legal and regulatory trends, international trends, technology developments, political developments and economic conditions. The relative strength of the competitor can be judged accurately only by assessing it with respect to the factors listed above. In the increasingly complex and uncertain business environment, the external [environmental] factors are assuming greater importance in effecting organizational change. Therefore, the determination of CI information needs is based upon the firm's relative competitive advantage over the competitor assessed within the 'network' of 'environmental' factors.
What are the General Uses of Competitive Intelligence Information?
The competitive intelligence information obtained using CIP can be used in programs that supplement planning, mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, marketing, pricing, advertising, and R&D activities.
What is the Role of the Organization's Internal Competitive Intelligence Unit?
Despite the increasing sophistication of CI tools and techniques, the most important role in a CIP remains that of the organization or its internal Competitive Intelligence Unit. Once the CI needs have been defined, the CI-unit is responsible for collection, evaluation and analysis of raw data, and preparation, presentation, and dissemination of CI. The CI-unit may handle all the activities itself, or it may assign some tasks to an outside contractor. Often, decisions have to be made on assignments of data collection, and data analysis and evaluation.
The CI-unit has to decide upon the choice of sources of raw data. Should it use government sources or online databases, interviews or surveys, drive-bys or on-site observations? It has also to decide if and when to deploy 'shadowing' and defensive-CI. Other decisions may involve choice of specialized interest groups (such as academics, trade associations, consumer groups), private sector sources (such as competitors, suppliers, distributors, customers) or media (such as journals, wire services, newspapers, financial reports) as the sources of information. Very frequently, such issues involve balancing various constraints, such as those of time, finances, staffing, etc. and therefore are based upon individual judgement.
Are there any Methods/Methodology for a Competitive Intelligence Program?
The purpose of CIP is to gather accurate and reliable information. The groundwork for the CIP is done through an internal Competitive Intelligence Audit which is primarily a review of the organization's operations to determine what is actually known about the competitors and their operations. As a starting point for obtaining CI data, the organization generally has some knowledge of its competitors, and its own CI needs. In absence of a definition of its information needs, the organization may not be able to deploy its resources effectively. To avoid such a scenario an organization may conduct a CI audit which is effectively a review of its current operations to determine what is actually known about the competitors and their operations. The CI audit helps in pinpointing the organization's CI needs.
When the organization has some knowledge about its competitors and its own CI needs, it proceeds to the stage of gathering CI data. Based upon the CI needs, relevant data can be gathered from the organization's own sales force, customers, industry periodicals, competitor's promotional materials, own marketing research staff, analysis of competitor's products, competitor's annual reports, trade shows and distributors. Specific CIP techniques include querying government resources and online databases, selective surveys of consumers and distributors about competitor's products, on-site observations of competitor's plant or headquarters, "shadowing" the markets, conducting defensive CI, competitive benchmarking, and reverse engineering of competitor's products and services.
Raw data is evaluated and analyzed for accuracy and reliability. Every attempt is made to eliminate false confirmations and disinformation, and to check for omissions and anomalies. Omission, which is the seeming lack of cause for a business decision, raises a question to be answered by a plausible response. Anomalies (data that do not fit) ask for a reassessment of the working assumptions (McGonagle & Vella, 1990). While the conclusions one draws from the data must be based on that data, one should never be reluctant to test, modify, and even reject one's basic working hypotheses. The failure to test and reject what others regard as an established truth can be a major source of error (Vella & McGonagle, 1987).
Evaluation and analysis of raw data are critical steps of the CIP. Data that lacks accuracy and reliability may be marginally correct data, concoction of very good data, bad data, or even disinformation. All data is produced or released for some certain purpose. In CIP, reliability of data implies the reliability of the ultimate source of the data, based upon its past performance. In CIP, accuracy of data implies the [relative] degree of 'correctness' of data based upon factors such as whether it is confirmed by data from a reliable source as well as the reliability of the original source of data. Evaluation of CI data is done as the facts are collected and unreliable or irrelevant data is eliminated. Analysis of remaining facts includes 'sifting' out disinformation, studying patterns of competitor's strategies, and checking for competitor's moves that mask its 'real' intentions (McGonagle & Vella, 1990). The resulting CI information is integrated into the company's internal planning and operations for developing alternative competitive scenarios, structuring attack plans and evaluating potential competitive moves.
What is a Competitive Intelligence Program?
"A formalized, yet continuously evolving process by which the management team assesses the evolution of its industry and the capabilities and behavior of its current and potential competitors to assist in maintaining or developing a competitive advantage" (Prescott and Gibbons 1993). CIP tries to ensure that the organization has accurate, current information about its competitors and a plan for using that information to its advantage (McGonagle & Vella, 1990).
How is Competitive Intelligence Different Than Business Espionage?
CI uses public sources to find and develop information on competition, competitors, and the market environment (Vella & McGonagle, 1987). Unlike business espionage, which develops information by illegal means like "hacking," CIP uses public information - all information that can be legally and ethically identified and accessed.
How to Determine Competitive Intelligence Information Needs?
Effective implementation of its CIP requires not only information about the competitors, but also information on other environmental trends such as industry trends, legal and regulatory trends, international trends, technology developments, political developments and economic conditions. The relative strength of the competitor can be judged accurately only by assessing it with respect to the factors listed above. In the increasingly complex and uncertain business environment, the external [environmental] factors are assuming greater importance in effecting organizational change. Therefore, the determination of CI information needs is based upon the firm's relative competitive advantage over the competitor assessed within the 'network' of 'environmental' factors.
What are the General Uses of Competitive Intelligence Information?
The competitive intelligence information obtained using CIP can be used in programs that supplement planning, mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, marketing, pricing, advertising, and R&D activities.
What is the Role of the Organization's Internal Competitive Intelligence Unit?
Despite the increasing sophistication of CI tools and techniques, the most important role in a CIP remains that of the organization or its internal Competitive Intelligence Unit. Once the CI needs have been defined, the CI-unit is responsible for collection, evaluation and analysis of raw data, and preparation, presentation, and dissemination of CI. The CI-unit may handle all the activities itself, or it may assign some tasks to an outside contractor. Often, decisions have to be made on assignments of data collection, and data analysis and evaluation.
The CI-unit has to decide upon the choice of sources of raw data. Should it use government sources or online databases, interviews or surveys, drive-bys or on-site observations? It has also to decide if and when to deploy 'shadowing' and defensive-CI. Other decisions may involve choice of specialized interest groups (such as academics, trade associations, consumer groups), private sector sources (such as competitors, suppliers, distributors, customers) or media (such as journals, wire services, newspapers, financial reports) as the sources of information. Very frequently, such issues involve balancing various constraints, such as those of time, finances, staffing, etc. and therefore are based upon individual judgement.
Are there any Methods/Methodology for a Competitive Intelligence Program?
The purpose of CIP is to gather accurate and reliable information. The groundwork for the CIP is done through an internal Competitive Intelligence Audit which is primarily a review of the organization's operations to determine what is actually known about the competitors and their operations. As a starting point for obtaining CI data, the organization generally has some knowledge of its competitors, and its own CI needs. In absence of a definition of its information needs, the organization may not be able to deploy its resources effectively. To avoid such a scenario an organization may conduct a CI audit which is effectively a review of its current operations to determine what is actually known about the competitors and their operations. The CI audit helps in pinpointing the organization's CI needs.
When the organization has some knowledge about its competitors and its own CI needs, it proceeds to the stage of gathering CI data. Based upon the CI needs, relevant data can be gathered from the organization's own sales force, customers, industry periodicals, competitor's promotional materials, own marketing research staff, analysis of competitor's products, competitor's annual reports, trade shows and distributors. Specific CIP techniques include querying government resources and online databases, selective surveys of consumers and distributors about competitor's products, on-site observations of competitor's plant or headquarters, "shadowing" the markets, conducting defensive CI, competitive benchmarking, and reverse engineering of competitor's products and services.
Raw data is evaluated and analyzed for accuracy and reliability. Every attempt is made to eliminate false confirmations and disinformation, and to check for omissions and anomalies. Omission, which is the seeming lack of cause for a business decision, raises a question to be answered by a plausible response. Anomalies (data that do not fit) ask for a reassessment of the working assumptions (McGonagle & Vella, 1990). While the conclusions one draws from the data must be based on that data, one should never be reluctant to test, modify, and even reject one's basic working hypotheses. The failure to test and reject what others regard as an established truth can be a major source of error (Vella & McGonagle, 1987).
Evaluation and analysis of raw data are critical steps of the CIP. Data that lacks accuracy and reliability may be marginally correct data, concoction of very good data, bad data, or even disinformation. All data is produced or released for some certain purpose. In CIP, reliability of data implies the reliability of the ultimate source of the data, based upon its past performance. In CIP, accuracy of data implies the [relative] degree of 'correctness' of data based upon factors such as whether it is confirmed by data from a reliable source as well as the reliability of the original source of data. Evaluation of CI data is done as the facts are collected and unreliable or irrelevant data is eliminated. Analysis of remaining facts includes 'sifting' out disinformation, studying patterns of competitor's strategies, and checking for competitor's moves that mask its 'real' intentions (McGonagle & Vella, 1990). The resulting CI information is integrated into the company's internal planning and operations for developing alternative competitive scenarios, structuring attack plans and evaluating potential competitive moves.
What are the Tools and Techniques for Competitive Intelligence Activities?
Different types of CI tools and techniques are available for different requirements of the CIP.
·Contacting Government Agencies can yield valuable data for the CIP, but may often require excessive lead time.
·Searching Online Databases is a faster method of finding competitive information, although it is more expensive. With increasing sophistication and affordability of information technology, this technique is expected to become less expensive. Database search does not provide information that has not been released to the public or that has not yet been collected.
·From Companies and Investment Community Resources Some types of data that are not widely available from databases can be procured by contacting the corporation itself or from investment community sources.
·Surveys and Interviews Surveys can yield plenty of data about competitors and products, while Interviews can provide more in-depth perspectives from a limited sample.
·Drive-by and On-site Observations of the competitor's [full or empty] parking spaces, new construction-in-progress, customer service at retail outlets, volume and pattern of [suppliers' or customers'] trucks, etc. can yield useful CI information about the state of the competitor's business.
·Competitive Benchmarking is used for comparing the organization's operations against those of the competitor's.
·Defensive Competitive Intelligence involves monitoring and analyzing one's own business activities as the competitors and outsiders see them.
·Reverse Engineering of competitor's products and services may yield important CI information about their quality and costs.
Any 'Standard' Tools and Techniques for all Competitive Intelligence Activities?
Not all CIP tools and techniques are suitable for all CI objectives; the CI-unit has to use judgement in determining the relevant CI needs and the most appropriate tools and techniques. Specific tools and techniques are chosen depending upon various factors such as CI needs, time constraints, financial constraints, staffing limitations, likelihood of obtaining the data, relative priorities of data, sequencing of raw data, etc. (McGonagle & Vella, 1990). While government sources have the advantage of low cost, online databases are preferrable for faster turnaround time. Whereas surveys may provide enormous data about products and competitors, interviews would be preferred for getting a more in-depth perspective from a limited sample. Therefore, human judgement is an essential element of the decision regarding which CI techniques to deploy in a specific situation.
How can the Competitors Foil Your Competitive Intelligence Program?
Very likely the target competitor would be aware of the organization's CI moves and could make all possible efforts to thwart or jeopardize the organization's CIP. The competitor may have its own CI activities targeted at the organization. Or it might intentionally generate disinformation to mislead the organization's efforts. In fact, the organization's CI activities may find data which the competitor has 'planted' to keep the organization "preoccupied" and "off-balance" (McGonagle & Vella, 1990).
The competitor could also create the problem of false confirmation by releasing similar, but misleading (or incomplete), facts to different media sources. The competitor may also use common ploys to pump information from the organization's employees. Such ploys include "the phantom interview", "the false flag job seeker", "the seduction," and "the nonsale sale."
· Phantom Interview The competitor, posing as a potential employer, inquires from the organization's employees about their duties and responsibilities.
·False Flag Job Seeker A competitor's trusted employee , in the guise of a potential job seeker, tries to learn about the organization in the course of the employment process.
·Seduction Involves flattery of organization's employees to encourage disclosure of important facts. In the nonsale sale technique, the competitor pursues the organization's nonemployee associates such as distributors and suppliers to elicit information about the organization's pricing structure, customer service, etc.
What are the Information Hazards of Competitive Intelligence Information?
The objective of the Competitive Intelligence Program is to gather relevant information that is valid and accurate. Incomplete or inaccurate information may jeopardize the organization's CI efforts.
·False Confirmation There might be instances of false confirmation in which one source of data appears to confirm the data obtained from another source. In reality, there is no confirmation because one source may have obtained its data from the second source, or both sources may have received their data from a third common source.
·Disinformation The data generated may be flawed because of disinformation, which is incomplete or inaccurate information designed to mislead the organization's CI efforts.
·Blowback Blowback may occur when the company's disinformation or misinformation that is directed at the competitor contaminates its own intelligence channels or information. In all such cases, the information gathered may be inaccurate or incomplete.
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Competitive Intelligence Programs: An Overview
DC Creator: MALHOTRA, Yogesh
DC Subject: Business intelligence, business spying, Competitive Intelligence Program
DC Description: The main interest of this article is to explain how Competitive Intelligence is different than Business Espionage. It also lists the tools and techniques for Competitive Intelligence activities
DC Publisher: Brint Research Institute
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 1996
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.brint.com/papers/ciover.htm
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: International
DC Rights: © Copyright, 1996, Yogesh Malhotra, Ph.D.,All Rights Reserved
jeudi 22 mars 2007
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2004
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX). Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2004. (on line), April 2005 (accessible at http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/fecie/fecie_2004.pdf). Consulted the 03-15-07.
Here is just the scope note. You can read the whole report by clicking the link above.
This is the tenth annual report reviewing the threat to the United States from
foreign economic collection and industrial espionage. The report seeks to
characterize and assess efforts by foreign entities—government and private—
to unlawfully target or acquire critical US technologies, trade secrets,
and sensitive financial or proprietary economic information. The paper
focuses on technologies, the loss of which could undermine US military
capability, impede the ability of US firms to compete in the world marketplace,
or have an adverse effect on the US economy, thereby weakening
national security and eroding the current US technological lead.
The report is being submitted in compliance with the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Section 809 (b), Public Law 103-359,
which requires that the President annually submit to Congress updated
information on the threat to US industry from foreign economic collection
and industrial espionage. It updates the ninth annual report published in
February 2004 and includes data for the fiscal year 2004, including the
period 1 October 2003 through 30 September 2004.
The contents of this report include the following:
• The types of foreign entities believed to be conducting industrial espionage.
• The kinds of information and technology targeted.
• The methods used by foreign actors to acquire that technology.
This report deals with the acquisition of sensitive US technology—either
classified or proprietary—by foreign entities, both government and private.
The acquisitions take a variety of forms, including:
• Economic Espionage, which is narrowly defined by Section 1831 of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EAA) to be the theft of trade secrets1
in which the perpetrator acts intending or knowing that the offense will
benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.
Proving links between foreign governments and entities caught stealing
US goods is often impossible, even where such links may exist.
• Industrial espionage or trade secret theft that cannot be linked to a foreign
government agent and where the acquisition has been made for the
intended economic benefit of someone other than the owner of the trade
secret. These violations are covered under Section 1832 of the EAA.
• Violations of export control regulations include the foreign acquisition of
restricted US dual-use technologies—having both military and civil
applications—by countries or persons that might apply such items to uses
inimical to US interests. These include goods that might be related to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and
those that could bolster the military and terrorism support capability of
certain countries. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) issued by
the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS), cover these violations.
• Illegal exports of US arms and implements of war (including
cryptography) and defense technology to proscribed countries that could
misuse or cause illegal proliferation of those items. These shipments are
prohibited under the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
which are administered by State Department’s Office of Defense Trade
Controls.
The paper highlights foreign efforts to target sensitive US technologies even
when those efforts are legal. For example, it is not illegal for foreign entities
to request classified or controlled information or technology, even
though the actual export of that technology would violate US laws. The fact
that such technologies are being targeted, however, is considered important
information for this report. This paper does not cover violations of US
copyright laws, such as the illegal plagiarism of videos, compact disks, or
other literary or artistic works.
This assessment is a product of a cooperative effort across the Counterintelligence
(CI) Community. It was compiled by the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) based on input from a broad crosssection
of US Government entities. In particular, databases compiled by the
Defense Security Service (DSS), the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI), the Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC), and the Army
Case Control Office (ACCO) were instrumental in providing much of the
detail for this assessment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—the
lead investigative agency for enforcing economic espionage statutes—provided
significant analytical and investigative information as did the Department
of Defense’s (DoD’s) Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2004
DC Creator: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX)
DC Subject: Industrial espionage, Economic Espionage, Business Intelligence
DC Description: “The paper highlights foreign efforts to target sensitive US technologies even
when those efforts are legal. For example, it is not illegal for foreign entities
to request classified or controlled information or technology, even
though the actual export of that technology would violate US laws. The fact
that such technologies are being targeted, however, is considered important
information for this report. This paper does not cover violations of US
copyright laws, such as the illegal plagiarism of videos, compact disks, or
other literary or artistic works.”
DC Publisher: National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 04-2005
DC Type: text
DC Format: PDF
DC Identifier: http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/fecie/fecie_2004.pdf
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: InternationalDC Rights:
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2004. (on line), April 2005 (accessible at http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/fecie/fecie_2004.pdf). Consulted the 03-15-07.
Here is just the scope note. You can read the whole report by clicking the link above.
This is the tenth annual report reviewing the threat to the United States from
foreign economic collection and industrial espionage. The report seeks to
characterize and assess efforts by foreign entities—government and private—
to unlawfully target or acquire critical US technologies, trade secrets,
and sensitive financial or proprietary economic information. The paper
focuses on technologies, the loss of which could undermine US military
capability, impede the ability of US firms to compete in the world marketplace,
or have an adverse effect on the US economy, thereby weakening
national security and eroding the current US technological lead.
The report is being submitted in compliance with the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Section 809 (b), Public Law 103-359,
which requires that the President annually submit to Congress updated
information on the threat to US industry from foreign economic collection
and industrial espionage. It updates the ninth annual report published in
February 2004 and includes data for the fiscal year 2004, including the
period 1 October 2003 through 30 September 2004.
The contents of this report include the following:
• The types of foreign entities believed to be conducting industrial espionage.
• The kinds of information and technology targeted.
• The methods used by foreign actors to acquire that technology.
This report deals with the acquisition of sensitive US technology—either
classified or proprietary—by foreign entities, both government and private.
The acquisitions take a variety of forms, including:
• Economic Espionage, which is narrowly defined by Section 1831 of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EAA) to be the theft of trade secrets1
in which the perpetrator acts intending or knowing that the offense will
benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.
Proving links between foreign governments and entities caught stealing
US goods is often impossible, even where such links may exist.
• Industrial espionage or trade secret theft that cannot be linked to a foreign
government agent and where the acquisition has been made for the
intended economic benefit of someone other than the owner of the trade
secret. These violations are covered under Section 1832 of the EAA.
• Violations of export control regulations include the foreign acquisition of
restricted US dual-use technologies—having both military and civil
applications—by countries or persons that might apply such items to uses
inimical to US interests. These include goods that might be related to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and
those that could bolster the military and terrorism support capability of
certain countries. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) issued by
the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS), cover these violations.
• Illegal exports of US arms and implements of war (including
cryptography) and defense technology to proscribed countries that could
misuse or cause illegal proliferation of those items. These shipments are
prohibited under the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
which are administered by State Department’s Office of Defense Trade
Controls.
The paper highlights foreign efforts to target sensitive US technologies even
when those efforts are legal. For example, it is not illegal for foreign entities
to request classified or controlled information or technology, even
though the actual export of that technology would violate US laws. The fact
that such technologies are being targeted, however, is considered important
information for this report. This paper does not cover violations of US
copyright laws, such as the illegal plagiarism of videos, compact disks, or
other literary or artistic works.
This assessment is a product of a cooperative effort across the Counterintelligence
(CI) Community. It was compiled by the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) based on input from a broad crosssection
of US Government entities. In particular, databases compiled by the
Defense Security Service (DSS), the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI), the Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC), and the Army
Case Control Office (ACCO) were instrumental in providing much of the
detail for this assessment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—the
lead investigative agency for enforcing economic espionage statutes—provided
significant analytical and investigative information as did the Department
of Defense’s (DoD’s) Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2004
DC Creator: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX)
DC Subject: Industrial espionage, Economic Espionage, Business Intelligence
DC Description: “The paper highlights foreign efforts to target sensitive US technologies even
when those efforts are legal. For example, it is not illegal for foreign entities
to request classified or controlled information or technology, even
though the actual export of that technology would violate US laws. The fact
that such technologies are being targeted, however, is considered important
information for this report. This paper does not cover violations of US
copyright laws, such as the illegal plagiarism of videos, compact disks, or
other literary or artistic works.”
DC Publisher: National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 04-2005
DC Type: text
DC Format: PDF
DC Identifier: http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/fecie/fecie_2004.pdf
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: InternationalDC Rights:
jeudi 15 mars 2007
Company Spies
DREYFUSS, Robert. Company spies. Motherjones (on line), June 1994 (accessible at http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1994/05/dreyfuss.html ). Consulted the 03-15-07.
Here is just an abstract. You can read the whole article by clicking the link above.
"Sometime in the not too distant future, you will probably drive a stolen car.
But the thieves won't be a neighborhood gang, nor will they be part of an organized crime ring. You will have papers to prove that you bought the car, and every month you will make payments to a bank. The bank, in turn, will show that it bought title from Ford, General Motors, or Chrysler.
But the Big Three U.S. auto companies will nonetheless be the recipients of stolen goods. And the perpetrator once again will be that expert at black-bag jobs, the Central Intelligence Agency.
When President Clinton announced last September that the federal government would join the Big Three in a cooperative research effort to improve U.S. automotive technology, he left out the fact that the CIA may be a silent partner. According to administration officials and sources in the intelligence community, the CIA has already begun a clandestine effort to help the American auto industry.
Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has been abuzz with talk about using the CIA for economic espionage. Stripped of euphemism, economic espionage simply means that American spies would target foreign companies, such as Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, and then covertly pass stolen trade secrets and technology to U.S. corporate executives.
R. James Woolsey, President Clinton's CIA director, has said repeatedly that the CIA will not engage in corporate spy work. Targeting foreign companies and giving that information to American companies is "fraught with legal and foreign policy difficulties," Woolsey says. But there is not the slightest hesitation among other top CIA officials that such information, when obtained, ought to be shared with American automakers.
The idea of using the U.S. intelligence community to give American companies an edge is an explosive subject that has divided the CIA and provoked bitter debate in Congress. It also raises troubling questions about whether a free society can accept the kind of help that the CIA provides when the question is not one of national defense but simply dollars and cents. "[...]
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Company Spies
DC Creator: DREYFUSS, Robert
DC Subject: economic espionage, business spying, business intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DC Description: The CIA has provoked debate in American Congress by spying on foreign competitors of American companies especially in the car industry sector.
DC Publisher: Motherjones
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 06-1994
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1994/05/dreyfuss.html
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: International
DC Rights:
Here is just an abstract. You can read the whole article by clicking the link above.
"Sometime in the not too distant future, you will probably drive a stolen car.
But the thieves won't be a neighborhood gang, nor will they be part of an organized crime ring. You will have papers to prove that you bought the car, and every month you will make payments to a bank. The bank, in turn, will show that it bought title from Ford, General Motors, or Chrysler.
But the Big Three U.S. auto companies will nonetheless be the recipients of stolen goods. And the perpetrator once again will be that expert at black-bag jobs, the Central Intelligence Agency.
When President Clinton announced last September that the federal government would join the Big Three in a cooperative research effort to improve U.S. automotive technology, he left out the fact that the CIA may be a silent partner. According to administration officials and sources in the intelligence community, the CIA has already begun a clandestine effort to help the American auto industry.
Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has been abuzz with talk about using the CIA for economic espionage. Stripped of euphemism, economic espionage simply means that American spies would target foreign companies, such as Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, and then covertly pass stolen trade secrets and technology to U.S. corporate executives.
R. James Woolsey, President Clinton's CIA director, has said repeatedly that the CIA will not engage in corporate spy work. Targeting foreign companies and giving that information to American companies is "fraught with legal and foreign policy difficulties," Woolsey says. But there is not the slightest hesitation among other top CIA officials that such information, when obtained, ought to be shared with American automakers.
The idea of using the U.S. intelligence community to give American companies an edge is an explosive subject that has divided the CIA and provoked bitter debate in Congress. It also raises troubling questions about whether a free society can accept the kind of help that the CIA provides when the question is not one of national defense but simply dollars and cents. "[...]
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Company Spies
DC Creator: DREYFUSS, Robert
DC Subject: economic espionage, business spying, business intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DC Description: The CIA has provoked debate in American Congress by spying on foreign competitors of American companies especially in the car industry sector.
DC Publisher: Motherjones
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 06-1994
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1994/05/dreyfuss.html
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: International
DC Rights:
mercredi 14 mars 2007
Intelligence leads the way
MC.KENNA, Ed. Intelligence leads the way. FCW.com (on line), Mai 13, 2002 (accessible at http://www.fcw.com/article76687 ). Consulted the 03-14-07.
Taxonomy software vendors say that the intelligence and defense communities are the main government users of their products, though the companies generally are reluctant to name names.
Those communities' acceptance of the software may be partly due to the fact that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funds development of many of the technologies, but it is more likely driven by agency needs.
"We have way too much information and are currently operating in a wartime operational tempo," said one Defense Department official. "Analysts must be able to rapidly locate critical pieces of information that can affect battlefield operations."
To support innovation in the market, In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital firm, is working with taxonomy specialists Stratify Inc. and Mohomine Inc., according to Greg Pepus, visionary solutions architect at In-Q-Tel.
Beyond the military and intelligence communities, taxonomy software is used in other areas of government. "People are just starting to learn" about these tools, Pepus said.
For example, the State Department is launching a pilot project using technology from Autonomy Corp. to provide taxonomy for a knowledge management, collaboration and basic desktop services project covering U.S. organizations overseas, said Bruce Froehlich, partner in Accenture's Government Group, the lead contractor on the project.
Also, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), an organization funded by the Justice Department, is using Autonomy's technology for the Global Justice Information Network initiative, a project to build an information infrastructure to increase data sharing among law enforcement agencies.
The system is being used by 25 people but should eventually reach thousands of users, said Clay Jester, director of information for IIR.
When it comes to medium and small agencies, "you've got to have a very strong business case," said Mike Burk, chief knowledge officer of the Federal Highway Administration.
FHWA is using a homemade solution to support 15 portals that it has built to address issues such as the National Environmental Policy Act.
"We are not using automated technology that analyzes or indexes the information," Burk said. Instead, the department is relying on experts in different communities of practice to contribute, categorize and maintain information on the sites.
"The intent is to get the concepts and practices in place in the organization," he said.
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Intelligence leads the way
DC Creator: MC.KENNA, Ed
DC Subject: Taxonomy software, Intelligence community, Business intelligence
DC Description: Explain why more and more organizations (mainly intelligence and defense communities) use taxonomy software
DC Publisher: FCW.com
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 05-13-02
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.fcw.com/article76687
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: International
DC Rights:
Taxonomy software vendors say that the intelligence and defense communities are the main government users of their products, though the companies generally are reluctant to name names.
Those communities' acceptance of the software may be partly due to the fact that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funds development of many of the technologies, but it is more likely driven by agency needs.
"We have way too much information and are currently operating in a wartime operational tempo," said one Defense Department official. "Analysts must be able to rapidly locate critical pieces of information that can affect battlefield operations."
To support innovation in the market, In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital firm, is working with taxonomy specialists Stratify Inc. and Mohomine Inc., according to Greg Pepus, visionary solutions architect at In-Q-Tel.
Beyond the military and intelligence communities, taxonomy software is used in other areas of government. "People are just starting to learn" about these tools, Pepus said.
For example, the State Department is launching a pilot project using technology from Autonomy Corp. to provide taxonomy for a knowledge management, collaboration and basic desktop services project covering U.S. organizations overseas, said Bruce Froehlich, partner in Accenture's Government Group, the lead contractor on the project.
Also, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), an organization funded by the Justice Department, is using Autonomy's technology for the Global Justice Information Network initiative, a project to build an information infrastructure to increase data sharing among law enforcement agencies.
The system is being used by 25 people but should eventually reach thousands of users, said Clay Jester, director of information for IIR.
When it comes to medium and small agencies, "you've got to have a very strong business case," said Mike Burk, chief knowledge officer of the Federal Highway Administration.
FHWA is using a homemade solution to support 15 portals that it has built to address issues such as the National Environmental Policy Act.
"We are not using automated technology that analyzes or indexes the information," Burk said. Instead, the department is relying on experts in different communities of practice to contribute, categorize and maintain information on the sites.
"The intent is to get the concepts and practices in place in the organization," he said.
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: Intelligence leads the way
DC Creator: MC.KENNA, Ed
DC Subject: Taxonomy software, Intelligence community, Business intelligence
DC Description: Explain why more and more organizations (mainly intelligence and defense communities) use taxonomy software
DC Publisher: FCW.com
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 05-13-02
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.fcw.com/article76687
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: International
DC Rights:
dimanche 11 février 2007
Next for the CIA: Business Spying?
MC.CARROLL, Thomas. Next for the CIA: Business spying. Time, Monday, Feb.22, 1993 (Accessible at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,977791-3,00.html ). Consulted the 02-08-07.
When executives at Science Applications International Corp., a California- based high-tech company, learned that a former employee had been stealing the codes to their computer programs, they brought charges against the man. But when they later found out that he had given those secrets to a spy ring that included Japanese corporate giants Mitsubishi, Nissan and Toshiba, there was little they could do to recoup the competitive advantage they had lost. The man was sentenced to six years in jail, but no action was ever brought against the Japanese companies, which claimed they did not know the information was stolen.
So it goes for hundreds of U.S. companies that, like SAIC, are routinely spied on by either foreign companies or foreign intelligence agencies acting on behalf of foreign interests. Once companies suspect they have been targeted, they usually have only two choices: hire a private investigator or contact local law enforcement. But a growing number of legislators and business leaders are pushing to allow American companies to call on the services of a special group of spies: the Central Intelligence Agency.
With the end of the cold war, the CIA has become more willing to consider sharing its business intelligence with private companies. At his confirmation hearing two weeks ago, the agency's new director, R. James Woolsey, told Senators that the issue "is the hottest current topic in intelligence policy." He is considering a controversial plan -- opposed by many civil libertarians and some of the agency's former directors -- to offer the CIA's intelligence to U.S. corporations. If the plan is approved, the CIA would pass on foreign trade secrets to U.S. firms as well as ferret out foreign agents snooping on American companies. It would also plant undercover agents in overseas firms to find out if those businesses are violating U.S. patents.
If turned loose, the spy service could eventually pay its own way by reducing rip-offs abroad. Trade-secret theft cost U.S. companies more than $100 billion in lost revenues last year. If left unchecked, analysts estimate, the losses could grow an additional 50% by the year 2003.
While industrial espionage may be a sticky subject for Americans, it's common in most other countries. Stealing U.S. industrial secrets was a cottage industry for the former Soviet KGB. Its infamous "Department X" routinely targeted American high-tech secrets. Although the unit was disbanded, the practice continues under the Russian government. The Chinese also regularly eavesdrop on U.S. firms. But the most active spying on U.S. companies lately has not been by agents from old cold-war adversaries. Instead, the spies are employed by allies, including Germany, South Korea and even Canada. Among the most relentless -- and efficient -- have been the Israeli secret services. Last year Recon/Optical, a suburban Chicago military contractor, charged the Israeli air force with trying to steal the blueprints for a top-secret airborne spy camera. The Israelis agreed to settle the case by paying $3 million in damages. The French intelligence service recruited moles in the European branch offices of IBM, Texas Instruments and other U.S. electronics companies. A decade ago, an FBI sting operation caught senior-level executives at Hitachi and Mitsubishi trying to buy confidential information on the latest IBM computer chip. After initially refusing to submit to U.S. jurisdiction, both companies pleaded guilty to charges connected with the theft.
As global competition heats up, spying among allies will grow more intense, says Peter Schweizer, author of the recently published book, Friendly Spies. Despite its persistent denials, Schweizer says the U.S. intelligence community has spied on friends and allies in the past. And American companies, such as Motorola, are setting up their own business-intelligence units. "In the new world order," he says, "yesterday's political allies are today's economic competitors." Schweizer foresees a fundamental shift in intelligence priorities. "Business secrets have become more vital than military secrets," he says. "And counting machine tools is now more important than tracking the number of battle tanks."
Most spy masters, from Richard Helms to William Casey, have preferred to keep the CIA out of corporate spying. Although the agency is forbidden to provide information directly to private companies, it will usually pass on tips through back channels when it stumbles across foreign schemes to steal commercial secrets. However, if the spy service happens upon foreign-trade secrets that would be useful to American firms, it must by policy keep the information to itself. That's as far as most CIA directors have been willing to go.
They rejected past proposals to involve the agency in business intelligence because of the nightmarish legal and logistical questions: Should the CIA conduct counterespionage operations only? What about offensive actions? How would CIA business intelligence be disseminated? To all U.S. companies or just a select few? Then there is the question of how much agents can be expected to do on behalf of corporations. Former CIA director Robert Gates recalls one agent's telling him: "Mr. Gates, I'm prepared to give my life for my country but not for a company."
As support for the idea builds, analysts are beginning to debate just how far CIA agents and officers should go in serving as corporate mercenaries. Most backers of the plan want the spy agency only to defend U.S. firms against foreign spies. Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Dennis DeConcini favors making CIA intelligence available to U.S. companies but does not support running special operations against Airbus or Toyota to gather information. Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner wants the agency to run both defensive and offensive operations. "For us to collect and use commercial intelligence is merely a matter of creating a level playing field," says Turner.
But even if the CIA enters the commercial-spying business, don't expect a stampede of corporate customers to the doors at Langley. The CIA's record for accuracy is far from perfect, and many U.S. executives fear that suspected CIA involvement in their business could scare off customers and suppliers overseas. They're also afraid that American companies themselves may eventually fall under the spy agency's watchful eye.
There is some question whether the CIA spooks who have spent their careers counting crates on the docks of Soviet ports can transfer those skills to deciphering the newest details of Fujitsu's latest supercomputer or the immediate implications of a hike in German interest rates. And even if they can, the bigger issue may be whether any short-term gains by some U.S. corporations will offset the potential losses in civil liberties at home and friendships abroad. In the end, that price may be judged too high to pay.
When executives at Science Applications International Corp., a California- based high-tech company, learned that a former employee had been stealing the codes to their computer programs, they brought charges against the man. But when they later found out that he had given those secrets to a spy ring that included Japanese corporate giants Mitsubishi, Nissan and Toshiba, there was little they could do to recoup the competitive advantage they had lost. The man was sentenced to six years in jail, but no action was ever brought against the Japanese companies, which claimed they did not know the information was stolen.
So it goes for hundreds of U.S. companies that, like SAIC, are routinely spied on by either foreign companies or foreign intelligence agencies acting on behalf of foreign interests. Once companies suspect they have been targeted, they usually have only two choices: hire a private investigator or contact local law enforcement. But a growing number of legislators and business leaders are pushing to allow American companies to call on the services of a special group of spies: the Central Intelligence Agency.
With the end of the cold war, the CIA has become more willing to consider sharing its business intelligence with private companies. At his confirmation hearing two weeks ago, the agency's new director, R. James Woolsey, told Senators that the issue "is the hottest current topic in intelligence policy." He is considering a controversial plan -- opposed by many civil libertarians and some of the agency's former directors -- to offer the CIA's intelligence to U.S. corporations. If the plan is approved, the CIA would pass on foreign trade secrets to U.S. firms as well as ferret out foreign agents snooping on American companies. It would also plant undercover agents in overseas firms to find out if those businesses are violating U.S. patents.
If turned loose, the spy service could eventually pay its own way by reducing rip-offs abroad. Trade-secret theft cost U.S. companies more than $100 billion in lost revenues last year. If left unchecked, analysts estimate, the losses could grow an additional 50% by the year 2003.
While industrial espionage may be a sticky subject for Americans, it's common in most other countries. Stealing U.S. industrial secrets was a cottage industry for the former Soviet KGB. Its infamous "Department X" routinely targeted American high-tech secrets. Although the unit was disbanded, the practice continues under the Russian government. The Chinese also regularly eavesdrop on U.S. firms. But the most active spying on U.S. companies lately has not been by agents from old cold-war adversaries. Instead, the spies are employed by allies, including Germany, South Korea and even Canada. Among the most relentless -- and efficient -- have been the Israeli secret services. Last year Recon/Optical, a suburban Chicago military contractor, charged the Israeli air force with trying to steal the blueprints for a top-secret airborne spy camera. The Israelis agreed to settle the case by paying $3 million in damages. The French intelligence service recruited moles in the European branch offices of IBM, Texas Instruments and other U.S. electronics companies. A decade ago, an FBI sting operation caught senior-level executives at Hitachi and Mitsubishi trying to buy confidential information on the latest IBM computer chip. After initially refusing to submit to U.S. jurisdiction, both companies pleaded guilty to charges connected with the theft.
As global competition heats up, spying among allies will grow more intense, says Peter Schweizer, author of the recently published book, Friendly Spies. Despite its persistent denials, Schweizer says the U.S. intelligence community has spied on friends and allies in the past. And American companies, such as Motorola, are setting up their own business-intelligence units. "In the new world order," he says, "yesterday's political allies are today's economic competitors." Schweizer foresees a fundamental shift in intelligence priorities. "Business secrets have become more vital than military secrets," he says. "And counting machine tools is now more important than tracking the number of battle tanks."
Most spy masters, from Richard Helms to William Casey, have preferred to keep the CIA out of corporate spying. Although the agency is forbidden to provide information directly to private companies, it will usually pass on tips through back channels when it stumbles across foreign schemes to steal commercial secrets. However, if the spy service happens upon foreign-trade secrets that would be useful to American firms, it must by policy keep the information to itself. That's as far as most CIA directors have been willing to go.
They rejected past proposals to involve the agency in business intelligence because of the nightmarish legal and logistical questions: Should the CIA conduct counterespionage operations only? What about offensive actions? How would CIA business intelligence be disseminated? To all U.S. companies or just a select few? Then there is the question of how much agents can be expected to do on behalf of corporations. Former CIA director Robert Gates recalls one agent's telling him: "Mr. Gates, I'm prepared to give my life for my country but not for a company."
As support for the idea builds, analysts are beginning to debate just how far CIA agents and officers should go in serving as corporate mercenaries. Most backers of the plan want the spy agency only to defend U.S. firms against foreign spies. Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Dennis DeConcini favors making CIA intelligence available to U.S. companies but does not support running special operations against Airbus or Toyota to gather information. Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner wants the agency to run both defensive and offensive operations. "For us to collect and use commercial intelligence is merely a matter of creating a level playing field," says Turner.
But even if the CIA enters the commercial-spying business, don't expect a stampede of corporate customers to the doors at Langley. The CIA's record for accuracy is far from perfect, and many U.S. executives fear that suspected CIA involvement in their business could scare off customers and suppliers overseas. They're also afraid that American companies themselves may eventually fall under the spy agency's watchful eye.
There is some question whether the CIA spooks who have spent their careers counting crates on the docks of Soviet ports can transfer those skills to deciphering the newest details of Fujitsu's latest supercomputer or the immediate implications of a hike in German interest rates. And even if they can, the bigger issue may be whether any short-term gains by some U.S. corporations will offset the potential losses in civil liberties at home and friendships abroad. In the end, that price may be judged too high to pay.
Dublin Core Analysis
DC Title: Next for the CIA: Business spying
DC Creator: MC.CARROLL, Thomas
DC Subject: Business intelligence, business spies, industrial espionage
DC Description: “…U.S. companies are routinely spied on by either foreign companies or foreign intelligence agencies acting on behalf of foreign interests. Once companies suspect they have been targeted, they usually have only two choices: hire a private investigator or contact local law enforcement. But a growing number of legislators and business leaders are pushing to allow American companies to call on the services of a special group of spies: the Central Intelligence Agency.”
DC Publisher: Time
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 1993-02-22
DC Type: text
DC Format: HTML
DC Identifier: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,977791-3,00.html
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: International
DC Rights:
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: International
DC Rights:
jeudi 1 février 2007
The economic espionnage act of 1996
DESMET, Thierry Olivier. The economic espionage act of 1996: are we finally taking corporate spies seriously? Article published in the Huston journal of international law, volume 22, number1, 1999 (Accessible at: http://www.hjil.org/Articles/ArticleFiles/22_1_5.pdf ). Consulted the 11-30-06.
The article itself is very long. Here is just the table of contents and the introduction:
THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996: ARE WE FINALLY TAKING CORPORATE SPIES SERIOUSLY?
Thierry Olivier Desmet*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................94
II. THE PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE......................95
III. PRIOR LEGISLATION FOR TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION.....101
IV. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996......................107
A. Legislative History...............................................107
B. EEA Provisions....................................................109
1. Section 1831.................................................109
2. Section 1832.................................................110
3. Section 1834.................................................112
4. Section 1835.................................................113
5. Section 1836.................................................114
6. Section 1837.................................................114
7. Section 1838.................................................115
8. Section 1839.................................................115
C. Cases..................................................................118
V. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS..............................................123
A. Litigation.............................................................123
B. Corporate Compliance..........................................125
VI. CONCLUSION...............................................................126
I. INTRODUCTION For many companies, information is the most important resource available. Many executives only realize the value of their corporation’s secrets when these secrets are stolen and disclosed to a competitor, resulting in huge economic losses.1 Since the end of the Cold War, American companies have increasingly been targeted by spies funded by competitors or foreign nations, or both, in search of trade secrets.2 The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA),3 enacted to facilitate the criminal prosecution of industrial spies,4 constitutes a new weapon against corporate spying. It makes the theft of proprietary economic information a felony and protects trade secrets at the federal level.5 By discouraging improper trade conduct by both foreign governments and private parties, it reflects Congress’s recognition of the need to protect U.S. technology from unethical business competitors. The EEA does so by providing severe criminal penalties for those prosecuted under its provisions.6
The scope of this Article is to analyze the EEA. Part II describes the nature of international and domestic economic espionage7 and why it is a threat to corporate success and national security. Part III looks at legislation in existence prior to the EEA and analyzes why that legislation failed to substantially curb the theft of trade secrets, particularly as it related to small businesses and information stolen by foreign participants. Part IV examines the EEA itself, its legislative history, and the case law that has emerged since its enactment. An analysis of the statute suggests that its provisions are very broad and that if not used selectively, it could potentially hamper the mobility of workers in the labor market, thereby reducing innovation and creativity in the U.S. economy. Part V considers the strategic implications of the Act for practitioners and corporations. This Article concludes, in Part VI, by suggesting a proactive plan allowing companies to protect their trade secrets from foreign spies and from their own employees who may sell that information to the highest bidder. Organizations that have implemented internal security programs are likely to be in the best position to protect their trade secrets from dishonest competitors while insulating themselves from a trade secrets prosecution.
DC Title: The economic espionage act of 1996: are we finally taking corporate spies seriously?
DC Creator: DESMET, Thierry Olivier
DC Subject: economic espionage, industrial espionage, corporate spies, business intelligence, law
DC Description:
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE
III. PRIOR LEGISLATION FOR TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION
IV. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
V. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
VI. CONCLUSION
DC Publisher: Huston Journal of International Law
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 1999
DC Type: text
The article itself is very long. Here is just the table of contents and the introduction:
THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996: ARE WE FINALLY TAKING CORPORATE SPIES SERIOUSLY?
Thierry Olivier Desmet*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................94
II. THE PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE......................95
III. PRIOR LEGISLATION FOR TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION.....101
IV. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996......................107
A. Legislative History...............................................107
B. EEA Provisions....................................................109
1. Section 1831.................................................109
2. Section 1832.................................................110
3. Section 1834.................................................112
4. Section 1835.................................................113
5. Section 1836.................................................114
6. Section 1837.................................................114
7. Section 1838.................................................115
8. Section 1839.................................................115
C. Cases..................................................................118
V. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS..............................................123
A. Litigation.............................................................123
B. Corporate Compliance..........................................125
VI. CONCLUSION...............................................................126
I. INTRODUCTION For many companies, information is the most important resource available. Many executives only realize the value of their corporation’s secrets when these secrets are stolen and disclosed to a competitor, resulting in huge economic losses.1 Since the end of the Cold War, American companies have increasingly been targeted by spies funded by competitors or foreign nations, or both, in search of trade secrets.2 The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA),3 enacted to facilitate the criminal prosecution of industrial spies,4 constitutes a new weapon against corporate spying. It makes the theft of proprietary economic information a felony and protects trade secrets at the federal level.5 By discouraging improper trade conduct by both foreign governments and private parties, it reflects Congress’s recognition of the need to protect U.S. technology from unethical business competitors. The EEA does so by providing severe criminal penalties for those prosecuted under its provisions.6
The scope of this Article is to analyze the EEA. Part II describes the nature of international and domestic economic espionage7 and why it is a threat to corporate success and national security. Part III looks at legislation in existence prior to the EEA and analyzes why that legislation failed to substantially curb the theft of trade secrets, particularly as it related to small businesses and information stolen by foreign participants. Part IV examines the EEA itself, its legislative history, and the case law that has emerged since its enactment. An analysis of the statute suggests that its provisions are very broad and that if not used selectively, it could potentially hamper the mobility of workers in the labor market, thereby reducing innovation and creativity in the U.S. economy. Part V considers the strategic implications of the Act for practitioners and corporations. This Article concludes, in Part VI, by suggesting a proactive plan allowing companies to protect their trade secrets from foreign spies and from their own employees who may sell that information to the highest bidder. Organizations that have implemented internal security programs are likely to be in the best position to protect their trade secrets from dishonest competitors while insulating themselves from a trade secrets prosecution.
Dublin core analysis
DC Title: The economic espionage act of 1996: are we finally taking corporate spies seriously?
DC Creator: DESMET, Thierry Olivier
DC Subject: economic espionage, industrial espionage, corporate spies, business intelligence, law
DC Description:
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE
III. PRIOR LEGISLATION FOR TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION
IV. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
V. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
VI. CONCLUSION
DC Publisher: Huston Journal of International Law
DC Contributor:
DC Date: 1999
DC Type: text
DC Format: PDF
DC Identifier: http://www.hjil.org/Articles/ArticleFiles/22_1_5.pdf
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: US
DC Rights:
DC Source:
DC Language: English
DC Relation:
DC Coverage: US
DC Rights:
Inscription à :
Articles (Atom)